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1. Introduction and Literature 
In recent years, family firms have received growing attention in economics. Most firms in the 
world  are  family  firms.  Gersick  et  al.  (1997)  report  that family  firms  account  for  65-80%  of  all 
worldwide business, and for about 40% of the Fortune 500 companies. Although many family firms 
are small, in aggregate they represent about half of the U.S. gross domestic product (Aronoff et al. 
1997) and employ over 80% of the work force (Neuberg and Lank, 1998).  
The  economics  of  family  firms  can  be  discussed  from  different  perspectives:  literature  on 
entrepreneurship focuses on the decision to enter into family businesses, labor market economists 
investigate the entrepreneurs’ decisions to retire and from the perspective of the corporate governance 
literature, family firms allow economists to study the patters of separation of ownership and control. 
The  focus  of  our  investigation  is  on  one  particular  aspect  of  family  firms:  the  issue  of  family 
succession. The circumstances of family succession are of great importance not only for the family 
members directly involved but also (per definition) for the long-run survival and success of family 
firms. In an extensive review of the existing research, Handler (1994) finds: ‘researchers in the field of 
family business agree that succession is the most important issue that most family firms face’ (p. 
133).
1  
The  importance  of  family  firms  and  family  succession  differs  between  economies  and  in 
particular between different sectors within the economy. By studying occupations of different family 
members (grandfathers, fathers, and sons), Laband and Lentz (1983) find that farmers’ are nearly five 
times more likely to have followed in their fathers’ footsteps than non-farm proprietors. It should thus 
come as no surprise that a large share of the literature on succession focuses on the farm sector.  
Previous research in this area suggests two possible explanations for the prevalence of succession 
within the family. The first stresses the importance of capital market imperfections. Pesquin et al. 
(1999)  point  out  that  intra-family  succession  enables  the  family  to  realize  benefits  from 
intergenerational  risk-sharing  when  annuity  markets  are  incomplete.  It  provides  an  often  implicit 
contractual  insurance  arrangement  since  the  generations  overlap  and  share  income.  The  authors 
mention additional advantages of intra-family farm succession such as ‘smooth’ transition, reduction 
in transfer cost, and lower transfer taxes. To the extent that capital market imperfections are important, 
successful entrepreneurs may be better able to transfer financial wealth to their offspring, thereby 
relaxing capital market restraints. 
The second explanation argues that parents transmit to their offsprings valuable work experience, 
reputation, and other managerial human capital. According to Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985), the 
existence of returns to land-specific experience creates incentives for children to work on the family 
farm when young. In addition, maintaining family control has a symbolic importance to many farm 
households and thus, the transfer of the farm to the next generation is often seen as a key objective of 
farmers (Gasson and Errington 1993; Blanc 1993). 
Empirical studies on succession in the farm sector typically examine the probability and the 
timing of family takeover. Analyzing actual farm successions on the basis of census data for Upper 
Austria,  Stiglbauer  and  Weiss  (2000)  find  the  probability  of  farm  succession  to  be  significantly 
influenced by farm, as well as, personal characteristics. Their results suggest that an increase in farm 
and family size, as well as a higher degree of on-farm diversification, raises the probability of farm 
succession within the family. Similar results are reported in Glauben, Tietje, and Weiss (2002) for 
Austrian survey data. By focusing on the timing of farm succession, Kimhi (1994) examines actual 
farm transfers on the basis of census data for Israel. The author finds that the transfer time varies 
systematically with family and farm characteristics. Transfer time decreases with parents’ age and 
with a child’s educational level, but increases with parents’ experience. Using survey data for 469 
Maryland farmers, Kimhi and Lopez (1997) also find that farm owners’ plans with respect to the 
                                                 
1  Succession  is  so  central  that  Ward  (1987)  chooses  to  define  family  firms  in  terms  of  the  potential  for 
succession: ‘we define a family business as one that will be passed on for the family’s next generation to 
manage and control’ (p. 252)   3 
timing  of  retirement  are  systematically  related  to  farm  and  household  characteristics.  Older  farm 
operators plan to retire later, as do more educated and wealthier farmers. On the basis of the same data 
set, Kimhi and Lopez (1999) investigate the importance of succession considerations for retirement 
plans of farmers. Glauben, Tietje, and Weiss (2002) additionally find that the time of succession is 
delayed as the age of the farm operator increases.  
The present study investigates the choice and the timing of intergenerational farm transfers using 
survey  data  which  are  linked  to  accounting  data  for  272  farms  in  Northern Germany.  Following 
previous work, we use a probit approach to examine whether specific farm and family characteristics 
are related  to the likelihood  of  succession  within  a  given  observation  period.  We  go  beyond  the 
existing literature by applying a competing risk approach (Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980) to study the 
process and thus  the timing,  respectively  of the two  competing  events  – succession or exit from 
farming. In addition, this study focuses on the importance of parents’ values and attitudes towards 
agriculture and farming. Finally, by combining data from a farm survey with farm accounting data, we 
hope to more accurately account for farm and financial characteristics in addition to the subjective 
evaluations  captured  by  a  survey.  The  data  are  described  in  section  2,  section  3  presents  the 
methodology and the empirical results and section 4 concludes. 
2. Data 
The analysis of inter-generational succession is based on a survey of 272 Northern German farm 
households in 2003. Only (full-time) farm operators aged 45 or above have been surveyed. The farm 
owners were asked about their farm transfer plans and several personal and household characteristics. 
In particular the respondents were asked to indicate which of the following alternatives best describes 
their actual plans: (a) succession within the family is very likely, (b) succession within the family is 
rather likely, (c) we have not made any specific successions plans and don’t know, (d) succession 
within the family is unlikely, and (e) succession within the family will not take place. In addition, 
farmers were asked to report the number of years until they plan to stop operating the farm, from 
which information on the timing of succession (or timing of farm exits) will be derived.  
The survey data also include information on personal and household characteristics such as the 
farm operators’ age (AGE), education (EDUC), number of male and female children (CM, CF), as 
well as the number of generations the farm has been in ‘the hand’ of the family. Moreover, several 
subjective assessments concerning farmers attitudes about farming and succession in general were 
collected and condensed into few variables via a factor analysis (see the appendix). We expect to find 
a close ‘tie to the farm’ (BOND) and a good financial situation (FINAN) to stipulate the probability of 
transferring the farm within the family, whereas a negative attitude towards ‘being a farmer’ (FARM) 
as well as exogenous restrictions of farm growth (GROW) might induce the opposite. Similar, some 
subjective personal characteristics (PERS), as for example the health of the owner, or some subjective 
attitudes to the succession process itself (SUCC) might influence the timing of retirement, that is the 
planed time to hand down the farm within the family or close down the farm and exit from farming 
(see below).    
This study gains additional advantage form the fact that the above mentioned survey data have 
been linked to individual accounting data for the period 1998 to 2002 in order to get more reliable 
information on the financial situation of the farm. We use average values for a three year period (1999 
to 2002) in order to reduce the impact of short-run fluctuations in the variables used. The variable 
‘annual farm profit’ (PROF) measures the annual income capacity from farming. The variable ‘owned 
farm land’ (OWN) is used as a measure of the farms assets and the value of the farm. The ‘land rent 
per hectare’ (RENT) measure the price per hectare leased in land and should be an indicator for the 
marginal returns of land. The variables ‘change of farm land’ (CHFL) and ‘net borrowed capital’ 
(NBC), respectively account for recent developments in the land endowment and a ‘well-defined’ 
capital  endowment  (leverage-effect  of  borrowings).  In  order  to  account  for  farm  differences  in 
technical efficiency, we carry out a Data Envelopment Analysis to construct an index of relative 
technical  efficiency  (TEFF).  This index  is  bounded  between  zero  and  one.  If  the  farm  is  on  the 
production frontier (best observed practice), it will be assigned an efficiency score of 1.    4 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis. Unfortunately, only 209 
of  the  272  farm  operators  have  reported  the  planed  time  of  retirement.  Thus  the  sample  for  the 
estimations regarding the timing equations thus is reduced to 209.  
 
Table 1: Definitions and Descriptions of Variables 
Variable  SYMBOL  Mean  Std.dev.  Min.  Max. 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Dummy variable for farm  FAMSUC  0.669   
succession (1 = farm succession  
is very likely or likely , 0 = else)     
Timing of succession (years  
until planned transfer)  TSU  7.219  4.558  1.000  25.000 
Timing of exit (years until  
planned exit)  TEX  10.364  6.953  2.000  25.000 
Profits from farming (1000 EUR)   PROF  59.493  52.954  -64.734  409.736 
Farmed land (ha)  FL  105.969  79.875  14.590  661.210 
Change in farmed land (ha)   CHFL  1.233  4.648  -21.920  27.610 
Owned farmed land (ha)  OWN  56.361  44.193  0.000  347.670 
Land rent (EUR/ha)  RENT  297.627  396.595  0.000  5588.333 
Net borrowed capital (1000 EUR)  NBC  127.363  168.304  -307.707  1095.646 
Dummy variable cash crop farms  CCRC  0.169   
with mainly root crops     
Dummy variable farms with  CCPIG  0.063   
cash crops and pig production     
Technical Efficiency (0-1)  TEFF  0.873  0.110  0.530  1.000 
Farmer's age  AGE  52.445  7.021  34.000  73.000 
Number of daughters  CF  1.313  0.926  0  4 
Number of sons  CM  1.040  0.914  0  3 
Land farmed from farmer’s   GEN  0.279  0.450  0  1 
family… (1= farmed since 5  
generations or more, 0= else)   
Farmer's education (1-5,  EDUC  1.746  0.994  1  4 
1= lowest level, 5=highest level) 
Factor value "bond to farm"  BOND  -0.074  0.979  -2.447  2.484 
Factor value „financial situation“  FINAN  0.031  1.022  -2.123  2.625 
Factor value "attitudes towards  FARM  0.022  1.012  -2.673  2.828 
being farmer" 
Factor value "restrictions  GROW  0.011  1.005  -3.181  2.163 
of further growth" 
Factor value „personal criteria“  PERS  0.041  1.019  -2.114  2.206 
Factor value „successor’s criteria“  SUCC  -0.009  1.025  -2.402  2.651 
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3. Methods and empirical results 
Probit apprach 
Following previous studies, we apply a standard probit analysis on the likelihood of succession 
over the whole observation period. Therefore, we summarize the statements (a) and (b) as ‘family 
succession is likely’ (FAMSUC = 1) and the statements (c) to (e) as ‘family succession is unlikely’ 
(FAMSUC = 0). Note, that almost 70% of all respondents reported, that family succession is likely.
2 
The results of the econometric analysis are shown in table 2.  
Table 2: Results of the econometric model on the probability of succession 
Variable  SYMBOL  Param.  (z-value)  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Profit / 100  PROF  0.766  (2.43) 
Change in farmed land  CHFL  0.076  (2.72) 
owned farmed land / 100  OWN  0.888  (2.44) 
Land rent / 100  RENT  0.162  (2.51) 
Net borrowed capital / 100  NBC  0.447  (3.04) 
Net borrowed capital² / 1000  NBC2  -0.261  (-0.87) 
Technical efficiency  TEFF  0.504  (0.47) 
Number of sons  CM  0.240  (1.98) 
Number of daughters  CF  -0.346  (-3.01) 
Farmers age  AGE  0.414  (2.68) 
Farmers age² / 100  AGE2  -0.340  (-2.31) 
Land farmed since 5 generations  GEN  0.468  (1.99) 
Farmers education  EDUC  -0.243  (-2.19) 
Bond to farm  BOND  -0.321  (-2.96) 
Attitudes towards being farmer  FARM  0.220  (2.23) 
Growth restrictions  GROW  0.175  (1.75) 
Constant    -13.579  (-3.24)   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
LogL:  -109.770  RLogL:  -172.666 
LR(DF):  125.791 (16)  N:  272 
R²MF:  0.364  R²MF:  0.266 
R²ML:  0.370  R²CU:  0.515 
AIC:  0.932  BIC:  -1209.939 
% Correct predictions  84.56 
% Correct predictions of “ones” (“zeros”)  86.46 (80.00) 
The  estimated  model  is  statistically  significant  at  1%  level  or  better,  as  measured  by  the 
likelihood ratio test. The model correctly classifies 86.6% of all observations, whereby 86.5% of all 
cases with ‘family succession is likely’ and 80.0% of the observations with ‘family succession is 
unlikely’  are  correctly  classified.  Over  all,  the  results  in  table  2  suggest  that  the  probability  of 
succession is significantly influenced by a number of personal, household, and farm characteristics as 
well as by farm operator attitudes to farming and succession (factor values).   
According to table 2, more profitable farms (PROF) report a significantly higher probability of 
being transferred within the family. These farms hold the best prospect of providing the succeeding 
child a reasonable and secure income in future. Similarly, Kimhi and Nachlieli (2001), Glauben et al. 
                                                 
2 One might argue, that category (c) ‘no decision made yet’ should be treated as a third category. Thus we 
additionally  estimate  a  multinomial  logit  model,  where  statements  (a)  and  (b),  and  (d)  and  (e)  are 
summarized and evaluated against alternative (c). We use a Wald Category Test (Long and Freeze 2004) 
and find the probit specification to be the most appropriate specification.   6 
(2002), and Hennessy (2002) report that the likelihood of succession increases with some measure of 
farm income.  
For a given profitability, the probability of succession significantly increase with the amount of 
own farm land (OWN). Land assets reflect the value of the farm and of the (inter-general) transfer. 
Further, more land also facilitates to overcome borrowing constraints and thus reduces restrictions to 
future farm growth. Thus, the higher the amount of land, the larger will be the willingness of the 
potential successor to take over the farm.   
Previous farm growth (CHFL) is positively related to the likelihood of succession. There might 
be a problem, however, of distinguishing cause and effect with respect to this variable. A farm, for 
example, that has invested in land in the past might be more attractive for a potential successor, 
increasing the likelihood of succession. Yet, the causation could also be reversed. Sociological studies 
as well as Kimhi et al. (1995) suggest that farm operators, who plan to transfer the farm within the 
family,  tend  to  have  an  incentive  to  expand  their  enterprise.  Farm  growth  and  the  likelihood  of 
succession would also be positively related. Differentiating empirically between the two explanations 
would require analyzing individual farms over a longer time period, which is not possible on the basis 
of our data set, unfortunately. 
At  first  glance  it  might  be  surprising,  that  a  high  rental  price  (RENT)  paid  per  hectare 
significantly increase the probability transferring the farm within the family. However, the rental price 
for land is an indication of the quality of land and a high rental price thus signals a high marginal 
return to land and a high potential to generate income.  
Table 2 suggests that the probability of succession first increases with the amount of outstanding 
debt  (NBC),  and  then declines again.  A negative relationship  between  debt and  the likelihood  of 
succession at high debt levels indicates an increasing probability of bankruptcy, which reduces the 
attractiveness of taking over the farm for the child.  
One should expect more efficient farms to be more attractive to the potential farm successor and 
the  likelihood  of  family  succession  thus  to  increase  with  a  measure  of  technical  efficiency.  The 
empirical  results,  however,  do  not  support  this  conjecture. The  parameter  estimate  of  TEFF  (our 
measure of technical efficiency derived from a DEA analysis) is not significantly different from zero. 
It remains unclear whether this is due to TEFF being a poor approximation of true differences in farm 
productivity or due to the fact that other explanatory variables (such as age, education, rental price of 
land, …) included in the probit model also capture part of these productivity effects. Table 2 clearly 
suggests that the probability of succession is significantly higher for farms, where the current farm 
operator has a high level of education (EDUC).  
It should come as no surprise, that the age of the farm operator (AGE) is of particular importance 
for the succession decision. The probability of succession first increases with the farm operator’s age, 
reaches its maximum at 60 years of age and then declines again. A number of studies support this non-
linear impact of age on succession considerations (Laband and Lentz, 1983; Stiglbauer and Weiss, 
2000; and Kimhi and Nachlieli, 2001, Glauben et. al 2002). As the age of the farm operator increases, 
he  will  be  more  aware  of  the  need  to  make  succession  plans,  thus  the  positive  ‘age/succession’ 
relationship. The negative relationship between age and the probability of succession at advanced ages 
of the farm operator might indicate that a farmer, who postpones succession will have more difficulties 
in  finding  a  successor  within  the  family  since  his  or  her  children  will  have  started  looking  for 
alternative employment in the non-farm economy (Kimhi, 1994).  
Following previous empirical studies (Pfeffer, 1989; Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000, Glauben et al. 
2002), we find the number of family members living on the farm to significantly influence succession 
considerations. The probability of succession is positively related to the number of sons (CM) but 
negatively  related  the  number  of  daughters  (CF).  This  might  be  due  to  the  concept  of  sons  as 
‘preferred successors’ (Kimhi and Nachlieli, 2001, p. 49).  
Research in sociology stresses, that the choice of becoming a farmer is strongly influenced by 
family traditions. Tradition also plays an important role in farm succession considerations in Germany.   7 
Farms  that  have  been  operated  by  the  same  family  for  at  least  five  generations  (GEN)  show  a 
significantly higher probability of being transferred to the next generations within the same family.  
Finally, farm operators (subjective) attitudes towards farming and family succession, that are 
condensed in factor values significantly contribute to the explanatory power of the probit model. As 
expected a closer ‘tie to the farm’ (BOND) and a higher contentedness with the financial situation 
(FINAN) significantly increases the likelihood or family succession, while a negative attitude towards 
being  a  farmer  (FARM)  significantly  decreases  the  probability  that  the  farm  will  be  transferred. 
Similarly, if further farm growth (GROW) is not considered to be restricted family succession will 
become more likely. Although these variables reflect the views of the current farm operator, the close 
relationship between parents’ and childrens’ attitudes is well documented in economic psychology.
3 
Competing risk approach 
This section focuses on the timing of the planned events. Farmers were asked, in which year they 
plan to stop operating the farm. The variable TIME then measures the number of years until this event 
takes place. To address this issue, one would estimate a duration model.  
Assume that the hazard rate into a specific event j, λj(τ), is separable into a baseline component 
λ0j(τ)  and  a  component  that  depends  on  a  linear  combination  of  observed  characteristics  x  and 
estimated parameters βj:  ( ) ( ) 0 ; exp j j j t x t xß λ λ   =   . If  exp 1 j xß   >   , then the risk of the event j 
for this individual would increase over the whole period, and if  exp 1 j xß   <    the opposite holds. 
Thus, hazard models describe the risk process and allow to gain insights into how risks change with 
the covariates ( ) ßx .  
In the present case, we distinguish between two different events: family succession and farm 
exits.  For those farm  operators,  which  report family  succession  to  be  likely  (FAMSUC  =  1),  we 
consider TIME to measure timing of succession. In cases where FAMSUC = 0, TIME refers to the 
timing of exits. It should be noted, that the two decisions (succession and exits) are ‘competing’ during 
a particular period of time. A farmer can choose one of the two options. Once a farmer has decided to 
hand over the farm to his successor in five years, for example, he no longer can make any plans about 
whether or not to close down the farm after this period. This implies that the timing of the competing 
event (in this case farm exit) is censored at this point in time. A similar reasoning applies for farm 
operators, who plan to close down the farm in five years. In this case, any plans on the timing of 
succession will be censored at this point.  
Since we are mainly interested in the analysis of the failure times of both events (succession and 
exit), and not of their risk processes, we specify the competing risk approach as an ‘accelerated failure 
time’  (AFT)  model.  In  this  case,  the  cause  specific  hazard  functions  can  be  written  as 
( ) { } 0 ; exp exp j j j j j j t x t xß xß λ λ     = − −     , where j denotes the respective event (Kalbfleisch and 
Prentice 1980, p. 170). Rearranging this equation gives a better understanding of the effects of the 












    = −       ⇔ exp j j j t xß τ   = −  .  As  can  easily  be  seen,  this  model 
specifies the effect of the covariates to be multiplicative on t (rather than on the hazard function). That 
is, we assume a baseline hazard function to exist and the effect of the regression variables to alter the 
rate at which an individual proceed along the time axis. That is, if  exp 1 j xß   =    then  j j t τ =  and 
                                                 
3 The impact of parents’ attitudes on the childrens’ views in the German agricultural sector is well documented 
in Neldert et al. (1981).   8 
time passes at its ‘normal’ rate. If exp 1 j xß   >   , then time is accelerated and the failure would occur 
earlier. If exp 1 j xß   <   , the opposite holds.  
Rearranging  exp j j j t xß τ   = −   into  exp j j j t xß τ   =  , allows to directly measure the impact of 
x on the time of failure of an event j. That is a positive coefficient of ßj postpones the expected failure 
time and vice versa for a negative parameter estimate. It often turns out to be more convenient (Cleves 
et  al.  2004)  to  estimate  the  following  log-linear  specification  of  the  ACT-Model: 
( ) ( ) ln ln ij ij j j T X ß τ = + ;  ( ) ; j succession exit = . 
Here, Tji denotes the expected failure time, measured in years until the event occur. Xij are event-
specific variables and ßj are the parameter to be estimated. Testing for different distributions of the 
random ‘quantity’  j τ  we find Weilbull to be the most appropriate distribution, thus 
1 p
j j pt e
α τ
− ∼ . 
Treating the failure time other than j as censored we can separately estimate the failure time of each 
event j (Prentice (1979, p. 168).    The  results  of  the  econometric  analysis  for  the  timing  of 
succession as well as the timing of exit are reported in table 3 and table 4.  
Both estimation models are significant at the 1% level or better as measured by the F-Test. As 
expected, a comparison of table 3 and table 4suggests different variables to be significantly related to 
the timing of the two competing events.  
Table 3: Results of the Econometric Model on the Timing of Succession 
Variable  SYMBOL  Param. (z-value) 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Farmers age  AGE  1.557  (4.03) 
Farmers age² / 100   AGE2  -3.313  (-4.56) 
Farmers age³ / 1000  AGE3  0.218  (4.83) 
Profits  PROF  -0.002  (-2.14) 
Change in farmed land  CHFL  -0.021  (-2.51) 
Net borrowed capital  NBC  -0.001  (-2.97) 
Land rent  RENT  -0.002  (-3.09) 
Successor’s criteria  SUCC  0.082  (1.83) 
Personal criteria  PERS  -0.109  (-2.72) 
Tax criteria  TAX  0.012  (0.32) 
Constant  α  -19.403  (-2.86) 
  p  2.289   
________________________________________________________________________________ 
LogL:  -163.505  RLogL:  -263.145 
LR(DF):  199.281 (10)  N:  209 
R²MF:  0.379  R²MF:  0.333 
R²ML:  0.615  R²CU:  0.668 
AIC:  1.679  BIC:  -725.431 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The age of the farm operator (AGE) turns out to be of particular importance for the failure time of 
both events. We find a significant non-linear relationship between the farm operator’s age and the 
timing  of  succession.  Succession  is  accelerated  first  as  the  age  of  the  farmer  increase,  and  than 
delayed.
4 This might be the result of bargaining between the farmer and the potential successor. As 
discussed in Kimhi (1997), the farmer has an incentive to indicate his willingness to hand over at an 
relatively  early  age  to  lure  the  successor  into  waiting.  Once  the  potential  successor  has  credibly 
                                                 
4 A similar pattern is reported in Glauben et al. (2002).   9 
committed  himself,  he  can  delay  his  retirement  decision.  The  exit-time  does  not  involve  such 
bargaining processes and no non-linear relationship is observed. 
In contrast to other studies, the present analysis is based on accounting data to measure financial 
and other characteristics of farms. We find several of these variables to influence succession (table 3). 
For a given age of farm operator, farm succession is significantly accelerated as farm profits (PROF) 
as well as the marginal returns of land (RENT) increase. Further, farmers with a relatively high level of 
debt  (NBC)  and  a  high  farm  growth  rate  in  the  past  (CHFL)  tend  to  transfer  the  farm  earlier. 
Successful farms clearly hold out the best prospects of providing the successor with a high and secure 
income. One should thus expect the willingness of the heir to take over the farm as soon as possible to 
increase. On the other hand, it is at least plausible – though hardly a tight deduction – that a healthy 
financial performance of the farm is an indication of a good farm operator who would not tend to 
delay the transfer decision. Viewed from the farm operator’s perspective only, Kimhi (1997) argues 
that it is not possible to state whether succession will be earlier or later in the presence of binding 
borrowing constraints. Finally, if the farm operator attaches high importance to factors characterizing 
his own personal situation (PERS), such as his own health status, he tends to delay handing over the 
farm. In contrast, if the operator is more altruistic and attaches more weight to the successor’s situation 
(SUCC), such that the successor insists to take over the farm, farm succession will be accelerated.   
 
Table 4: Results of the econometric model on the timing of closure 
Variable  SYMBOL  Param.  (z-value) 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Farmer’s age  AGE  -0.064  (-5.38) 
Number of daughters  CF  -0.141  (-2.11) 
Farmed land  FL  0.013  (5.80) 
Cash crop farms (root crops)  CCRC  -0.635  (-3.64) 
Cash crop – pig production farms CCPIG  -0.490  (-2.80) 
Technical Efficiency  TEFF  2.581  (4.75) 
Personal criteria  PERS  0.202  (2.62) 
Tax criteria  TAX  -0.083  (-1.31) 
Bond to farm  BOND  -0.232  (-3.02) 
Financial Situation  FINAN  0.231  (3.86) 
Constant  α  3.494  (4.36) 
  p  4.106   
________________________________________________________________________________ 
LogL:  -27.657  RLogL:  -69.295 
LR(DF):  83.276 (10)  N:  209 
R²MF:  0.601  R²MF:  0.428 
R²ML:  0.329  R²CU:  0.678 
AIC:  0.379  BIC:  -997.126 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The timing of closing down and exiting from the farm business is also significantly related to 
farm characteristics and personal attitudes (table 4). As expected, farm owners’ of large farms (FL) as 
well as farms characterized by a high level of technical efficiency (TEFF) tend to retire later. As 
argued in Miljkovic (2000), efficient farmers tend to suffer less from “harm of work” and thus retire 
later. Further retirement is accelerated for relatively specialized enterprises, as cash-crop and cash 
crop/pig production farms (CCRC, CCPIG). To be successful, specialized farms usually need more 
modern technical know-how, and the willingness to acquire this know-how tends to decline with age. 
Finally a low value for the farmer’s subjective affection to the farm (BOND) significantly reduces the 
time  until  retirement.  On the other  hand,  a  high agreement  of the  respondents  with some  survey 
personal statements (PERS) would enforce farmers to retire later. Finally, a high contentedness with 
the financial situation (FINAN) induces later retirement.     10 
4. Summary  
A distinguishing feature of agriculture is the predominance of family businesses and the way in 
which this structure is replicated by the transfer of farms between generations of the same family. 
Whereas researches in the field of family business agree, that the intergenerational transfer decision is 
one of the most important issue that family firms face, only few studies have investigated these issues 
econometrically so far.  
This  work  examines  family  and  farm  characteristics  affecting  the  choice  and  the  timing  of 
intergenerational farm transfers using survey data which are linked to individual accounting data for 
272 farm household in Northern Germany. Within a probit approach, we examine whether specific 
farm and family characteristic as well as some subjective attitudes are related to the likelihood of 
succession within a given observation period. In a second step, we go beyond the existing literature by 
applying a competing risk approach which is specified as an “accelerated failure time” model to study 
the  timing  of  farmers’  retirement  decision  and  thus  the  timing  of  either  succession  or  exit  from 
farming.  
Farm  characteristics  significantly  influence  succession  considerations.  The  likelihood  of 
succession increases with farm profits and the amount of own farm land. Further, the number of 
household members living on farm also significantly influences succession plans. The probability of 
succession first increases with the age of the operator and then decline again.  Tradition also plays an 
important role in farm succession considerations in Germany. Farms that have been “in the hand” of 
the  same  family  for  at  least  five  generations  show  a  significantly  higher  probability  of  being 
transferred to the next generations within the same family. Finally, different (subjective) attitudes of 
the farm operators towards farming and family succession that are condensed in the factor values 
significantly contribute the explanation of the succession decision. 
Regarding the timing of farm operator’s retirement, we find some farm and family characteristics 
to have an impact on the two competing destinations (family succession or exit from farming). While, 
for example, we find a significantly non-linear relationship of farm operator’s age and the timing of 
succession, the timing of closing the firm shows a significant linear relationship to farmers’ age. The 
non-linear pattern on succession time indicates that succession is first accelerated as the age of the 
farmer increase, and than delayed. For a given age of farm operator, farm succession is significantly 
accelerated as profits and the marginal returns of land increase, while farm owners’ of large farms as 
well as farms characterized by a high technical efficiency tend to close down business later. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Surveyed Attitudes and Resulting Factors 
Close  bond  to  farm 
(BOND) 
Negative  attitude 
towards being farmer 
(FARM) 
Financial  situation 
(FINAN) 
Restrictions  of 
further  farm  growth 
(GROW) 
Farmer  by  
tradition + 
Too  much  work  on 
farm + 
Reasonable  income 
from farming + 
Leasing  contracts 
missing +  
Would like to stay on 
farm + 
Successor  can’t  find 
a partner + 
Difficult  financial 
situation + 
Conditions  restrict 
farming + 
Old  age  support 
important + 
  Investments 
necessary + 
 
Farm  should  stay 
within family + 
     
 
Table A2: Surveyed Criteria for the Timing of Succession and Resulting Factors 
Personal criteria (PERS)  Successors criteria (SUCC)  Tax criteria (TAX) 
Own age +  Successor’s age +  Income tax + 
Own health +  End of apprenticeship +  Gift tax + 
Don’t like to farm anymore +  Successor insists on transfer 
+  
 
Criteria for pension payment +  Successor’s  family 
circumstances +  
 
  Young farmer programs +   
   14 
Table A3. Definition and Description of Variables – AFT-Model 
Variable  SYMBOL  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Timing of succession (years  
until planned transfer)  TSU  7.219  4.558  1  25 
Timing of exit (years until  
planned exit)  TEX  10.364  6.953  2  25 
Farmer’s age  AGE  53.000  6.819  34  73 
Profits from farming (1000 EUR)  PROF  59.629  51.550  -64.734  409.736 
Farmed land (ha)  FL  109.771  84.892  14.590  661.210 
Change in farmed land (ha)  CHFL  1.444  5.024  -21.920  27.610 
Net land rent (EUR/ha)  RENT  308.403  440.920  0.000  5588.333 
Net borrowed capital (1000 EUR)  NBC  130.687  171.578  -307.707  1095.646 
Technical efficiency (0-1)  TEFF  0.873  0.112  0.530  1.000 
Dummy variable cash crop  CCRC  0.177   
farms with mainly root crops     
Dummy variable farms with  CCPIG  0.067 
cash crops and pig production       
Number of daughters  CF  1.033  0.917  0  3 
Factor value „successor’s criteria“  SUCC  -0.110  0.964  -2.005  2.144 
Factor value „personal criteria“  PERS  -0.110  1.022  -2.402  2.651 
Factor value „tax criteria“  TAX  -0.061  1.012  -2.554  1.988 
Factor value „bond to farm“  BOND  -0.095  0.970  -1.919  2.484 
Factor value „financial situation“  FINAN  -0.008  1.048  -2.123  2.625 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 